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Exports, Banking and Antitrust: The
Export Trading Company Act-A
Modest Tool for Export Promotion
George E. Garvey *
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an almost universally held perception that expanded export
trade is essential to a robust United States economy. President Carter,
for example, stated in a report to Congress that export expansion is criti-
cal to the health of our economy.' Huge balance of payments deficits in
recent years,2 the increasingly successful and visible penetration of
United States markets by foreign producers, and substantial unemploy-
ment in basic industries have all fuelled this concern. These conditions
have led naturally to a two-pronged response by the public and members
of Congress: first, the call for greater protection against foreign competi-
tion;3 and second, a substantial effort to establish policies that will pro-
* Professor, Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law; J.D., University of Wis-
consin (1972); B.A., University of Illinois (1969). Former Counsel to the Subcommittee on Monopo-
lies and Commercial Law, House Committee on the Judiciary (1980-1981).
1 REPORTS BY THE PRESIDENT, 96TH CONG. 2D SESS., EXPORT PROMOTION, EXPORT DISIN-
CENTIVES, AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS I (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORTS BY
THE PRESIDENT]. See also Export Trading Company Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 144 Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Finance and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (testimony of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce) [here-
inafter cited asS. 144 Hearings]; S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 27]; Malabre, Trade is Playing Fast-Growing Role in Economic Picture of the U.S.,
Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1980, at 56, col. 1.
2 See Fugate, The Export Trade Exception to the Antitrust Laws: The Old Webb-Pomerene Act
and the New Export Trading Company Act, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 675 (1982).
3 See, e.g., H.R. 1234, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) ("Domestic Content" legislation); see also
Protectionist Feelings Against Japan Increase in the U.S. and Europe, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1983, at 1,
col. 6.
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mote United States export activities.4
The likelihood that any benefits will flow from "protectionist" poli-
cies is remote. The imposition by the United States of tariffs, quotas and
other non-tariff barriers, such as domestic content laws, will invite retali-
ation from our trading partners. It also will jeopardize the healthy move-
ment of recent decades toward international free trade by institutions
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)5 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).6
Furthermore, gains in production or employment experienced in one in-
dustry are likely to be offset by losses elsewhere.7
Export expansion is, therefore, a safer response to the needs of the
United States economy. Fortunately, legislation intended to promote ex-
ports has been more successful to date than protectionist measures. This
article discusses The Export Trading Company Act ("the Act"),8 which
is intended to:
assist our domestic companies in finding their way through the thicket of
regulations that may bar the door [to export trading]. In effect, this is a
positive, aggressive approach to the problem of nontariff barriers, one that
steers clear of protectionist legislation which carries the danger of retalia-
tion and a full-scale trade war.
9
The Export Trading Company Act represents the merger, with
modifications, of several bills intended to promote United States export
trade.'0 It contains four distinct sections. Title I establishes an export
4 See, e.g., REPORTS BY THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1; S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S.
144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1799, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1648, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S.864, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
5 See FULDA & SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
103-04 (1970).
6 See JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1977); LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CON-
TROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11-41 (1979).
7 Dunn, Save an Auto Worker's Job, Put Another American Out of Work Wash. Post, Oct. 28,
1982, at A23, col 1; Rowen, .. And Other Protectionist Pitfalls, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1982, at A23,
col. 2.
8 The Export Trading Company Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 4001 (1982)). [hereinafter cited as ETC Act] On October 1, 1982, the United States'
House of Representative and Senate agreed to the Report of the Committee of Conference on the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982. President Reagan signed the legislation on October 8. The
legislation consists of four Titles, with Title I actually being the Export Trading Company Act of
1982. The legislation, however, is generally identified by this name and reference in this article to
the Export Trading Company Act will be to the entire statute unless otherwise designated.
9 128 CONG. REC. E2333 (daily ed. May 19, 1982) (statement of Rep. Don Bonker).
10 The legislation consists of four Titles: Title I is the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. § 4001-03 (1982); Title II is the Bank Export Services Act (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as BES Act]; Title III does not contain a short title but earlier versions of
this title were called the Export Trade Association Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as ETA Act]; and Title IV is the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15
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promotion office in the Department of Commerce.'1 Title II permits
bank holding companies, and related Edge Act or agreement corpora-
tions, to invest in and extend credit to export trading companies. 12 It
also authorizes the Export-Import Bank of the United States to guaran-
tee loans extended to export trading companies. 3 The third title estab-
lishes a government review and certification procedure to provide export
associations with limited antitrust immunity.' 4 Finally, title IV of the
Act clarifies the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act and of the "un-
fair methods of competition" clause of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'"
The antitrust provisions of the Act are responsive to the perception
that United States antitrust laws have been a needless barrier to aggres-
sive export activities by American firms.' 6 They are also based on a be-
lief that the existing antitrust exemption for export companies, the
Webb-Pomerene Act,17 is too uncertain to remove the fear of Sherman
Act exposure for concerted export activities.' 8
The Export Trading Company Act is built on faith in two institu-
tions: the federal government and banks. The government, primarily
U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1982) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Improvements Act]. For a general
background on the legislation and legislative efforts preceding adoption of the Export Trading Com-
pany Act, see Cole, Establishing America Trading Companies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 277 (1980);
Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1
(1982); Murphy, The Export Trade Association Act of 1981-A BriefAnalysis, 4 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 399 (1981); Reinsch, The Export Trading Company Act of 1981, 14 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 47 (1982).
11 ETC Act, supra note 8, § 104.
12 BES Act § 203 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)).
13 Id. § 206.
14 ETA Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21 (1982).
15 Antitrust Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1982).
16 See M. Dawson, Lessons From the Past: A Comparative Study of National Export Expan-
sion Programs 1963-1980 (undated study published by the Landegger Program in Int'l Bus. Diplo-
macy at Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Serv.); Hearings on H.R. 2326, H.R. 1648, and H.R.
2459 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (statement of Martin F.
Connor on behalf of The Business Roundtable); Dempsey, The Whole World is the Market-Impli-
cations for U.S. Antitrust Policy, in ANTITRUST AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS,
INT'L ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEP'T., NAT'L. ASS'N. MFRS., (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS]; Stevenson, U.S. Antitrust Policy and International Economic
Realities, in U.S. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra. But see House Hearings, supra (state-
ment of James A. Rahl, Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern University); Ongman, Is
Somebody Crying "Wolf"?: An Assessment of Whether Antitrust Impedes Export Trade, I N.w. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 163 (1979); Shenefield, Antitrust and U.S. Exports-Myth Over Reality, in U.S.
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra.
17 Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982).
18 Fugate, supra note 2, at 674; Hirschhorn, A Shot in the Arm for American Exports, 69 A.B.A.
J. 746 (1983).
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through the Commerce Department and Federal Reserve Board, is ex-
pected to promote the creation and utilization of export trading compa-
nies. The Commerce Department, with the concurrence of the Justice
Department, also will offer exporters safe passage, within limits, through
the shoals of the antitrust laws. Finally, bank holding companies and
related institutions are predicted to bring new capital, experience and
contacts to export promoting activities.19
After discussing briefly some of the statute's economic implications
and limitations, this article will analyze the more significant provisions of
the Act. The Act only recently has been implemented so there is insuffi-
cient experience or empirical basis for critiquing the performance of the
enforcement agencies.2 0 It is not premature, however, to suggest that all
administrative and enforcement policies should foster a limited role for
government in the operation of export markets. Therefore, regulators
empowered to exempt firms from potential antitrust liability should rec-
ognize the dual problems inherent in their regulatory activities: They
must not impede the efficient organization of an industry as dictated by
competitive market forces, and they must not sanction combinations that
have the power to limit world-wide production and exact supercompeti-
tive profits from foreign and domestic consumers. Both extremes would
necessarily limit production and impede the efficient allocation of re-
sources. In short, those implementing the Act should foster organiza-
tions that create otherwise unattainable efficiencies but do not acquire
excessive monopoly power.
II. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS AND GOALS
The major significance of title I of the Act is found in the findings of
fact and statement of purpose, which demonstrate the principal Congres-
sional assumptions and expectations underlying this legislation.2" Those
19 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 27,supra note 1, at 10-16; Cole, Establishing American Trading Compa-
nies, 2 N.w. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 277, 289-90 (1980).
20 The Department of Commerce has issued interim regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 10600 (1983) and
guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 15937 (1983). The experience under the Act to date has been recently
summarized by Donald Zarin, formerly with the Office of General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce. Mr. Zarin notes that neither banks nor non-bank trading firms have yet demonstrated sub-
stantial interest in the Act's provisions. He suggests that some applicants for certificates of review
have not required antitrust protection and are perhaps seeking government approval as a public
relations device. Zarin believes, however, that the potential benefits of the law will become clearer
over time and that participation by banks and others will increase substantially. Former Commerce
Dep't Official Foresees Rising Interest In ETCs, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1750, at 204 (Feb. 2, 1984).
21 (a) The Congress finds that-
(1) United States exports are responsible for creating and maintaining one out of every nine
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factors which bear most directly on the substantive provisions of the law
may be summarized as follows:
1. there are currently insufficient firms providing export-related services
to meet the needs of thousands of small- and medium-sized potential
exporters, particularly service organizations;
22
2. those firms that do exist generally have been unable to achieve sufficient
size to capture available scale economies and lack needed financial
leverage;
2 3
manufacturing jobs in the United States and for generating one out of every seven dollars of
total United States goods produced;
(2) the rapidly growing service-related industries are vital to the well-being of the United
States economy inasmuch as they create jobs for seven out of every ten Americans, provide 65
percent of the Nation's gross national product, and offer the greatest potential for significantly
increased industrial trade involving finished products;
(3) trade deficits contribute to the decline of the dollar on international currency markets and
have an inflationary impact on the United States economy;
(4) tens of thousands of small- and medium-sized United States businesses produce exportable
goods or services but do not engage in exporting;
(5) although the United States is the world's leading agricultural exporting nation, many farm
products are not marketed as widely and effectively abroad as they could be through export
trading companies;
(6) export trade services in the Unted States are fragmented into a multitude of separate func-
tions, and United States exporters;
(7) the United States needs well-developed export trade intermediaries which can achieve eco-
nomics of scale and acquire expertise enabling them to export goods and services profitably, at
low per unit cost to producers;
(8) the development of export trading companies in the United States has been hampered by
business attitudes and by Government regulations;
(9) those activities of State and local governmental authorities which initiate, facilitate, or
expand exports of goods and services can be an important source for expansion of total United
States exports, as well as for experimentation in the development of innovative export programs
keyed to local, State, and regional economic needs;
(10) if United States trading companies are to be successful in promoting United States ex-
ports and in competing with foreign trading companies, they should be able to draw on the
resources, expertise and knowledge of the United States banking system, both in the United
States and abroad; and
(11) the Department of Commerce is responsible for the development and promotion of
United States exports, and especially for facilitating the export of finished products by United
States manufacturers.
(b) It is the purpose of this Act to increase United States exports of products and services by
encouraging more efficient provision of export trade services to United States producers and
suppliers, in particular by establishing an office within the Department of Commerce to pro-
mote the formation of export trade associations and export trading companies, by permitting
bank holding companies, bankers' banks, and Edge Act corporations and agreement corpora-
tions that are subsidiaries of bank holding companies to invest in export trading companies, by
reducing restrictions on trade financing provided by financial institutions, and by modifying the
application of the antitrust laws to certain export trade.
ETC Act § 102; 15 U.S.C. § 4001 (1982).
22 Id. §§ 102(a)(2), (4), (6), (7), (9); 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001(a)(2),(4),(6),(7),(9).
23 Id. §§ 102(a)(6), (7); 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001(a)(6),(7). The finding of fact in subsection (5) that
export trading companies are needed to further promote agricultural exports is dubious. The grain
trade of the world is dominated by several well developed and substantial grain trading companies,
including Cargill, Inc. and Continental Grain Company. D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN
(1979). The belief that new trading companies can have an appreciable impact on agricultural ex-
ports, at least in the near future, also ignores the bleak market conditions facing the international
agricultural community. See Shellenbarger, Shock for Growers, Falling Grain Exports Bruise the
Farm Belt; Damage Could Spread, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
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3. promotion by the federal government and equity participation by banks
will produce sufficiently large export trading companies to resolve these
problems.
24
These assumptions demonstrate limited faith in the ability of a mar-
ket economy to adapt to changing conditions. They also represent a sur-
prising commitment to government intervention at a time when there is a
general emphasis on deregulation.2"
The National Association of Export Companies estimates that there
are about 2,000 export trading companies serving United States manufac-
turers and service organizations.26 Although many of these companies
are relatively small, they generally have experienced rapid growth in re-
cent years.27 There are also several giant trading companies currently
serving United States exporters. Cargill and Continental Grain, both
United States companies, are among the largest grain trading companies
in the world,28 and Philipp Brothers is a major international marketer of
raw materials. 29 Furthermore, Japanese trading companies have become
significant participants in the United States export market.30 In 1980, for
example, Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.) exports from the United States totaled
$3.8 billion and Mitsubishi International's United States exports
amounted to $3 billion.3' Finally, some major United States corpora-
tions, including Sears and General Electric, have established or an-
nounced their intention to create trading companies.
32
The number, diversity and growth, both individually and collec-
tively, of exporting principals and intermediaries is persuasive evidence
24 ETC Act §§ 102(a)(10), (b); 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001(a)(10),(6). It is noteworthy that a major focus
of the legislation is on antitrust reform although the findings of fact never refer to the antitrust laws,
except, perhaps, cryptically in finding (8): "the development of export trading companies in the
United States has been hampered by business attitudes and by Government regulations."
25 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS 177-313 (1979); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND
ITS REFORM (1982); D. BoIs & P. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS 955-76 (1977); L.
WEISS, Introduction: The Regulatory Reform Moyement, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION
REVOLUTION AND REFORM I (L. Weiss & M. Klass, eds. 1981); Lippman, GOP Panel Urges Con-
gress to Sweep Regulations Out, Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1983, at C6, col. 5.
26 Abbott, Missing the Boat on Export Trading Companies, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. ON Gov.
& Soc. 39, 43 (Nov./Dec. 1982).
27 S. 144 Hearings, supra note 1, at 396 (statement of National Association of Export Compa-
nies, Inc.). Many existing firms are known as export management companies. Since they fit the
statutory definition of export trading companies, this article will not distinguish between the two.
The Association's members have grown seven-fold in the last decade.
28 D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN (1979).
29 Inside Philipp Bros., A $9 Billion Supertrader, Bus. WK., Sept. 3, 1979, at 108.
30 Lachica, Unlikely American Exporter: Japan, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1981, at 31, col. 2.
31 Id.
32 Abbott, supra note 26, at 40-41; G.E. Sets Up Firm to Spur Exports of It and Others, Wall St.
J., Mar. 9, 1982, at 10, col. 3.
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that the market has been working satisfactorily. The private enterprise
system has been generating needed export services; the idea that govern-
ment will do it better is questionable.
The assumption that large trading companies necessarily will
achieve desirable efficiencies, as well as the apparent belief that entrepre-
neurs will not recognize available economies without government inter-
vention, is also dubious. The equation of size and efficiency fails to
account for the diversity and complexity of markets generally, and mar-
kets for exported goods and services in particular.
An elaborate analysis of the scale economies of trading companies is
beyond the scope of this article, but several factors suggest that larger
firms need not enjoy advantages over smaller ones. Initially, it is proba-
bly impossible to reach any conclusion about the optimal size of trading
firms because of their diversity. A trading company may be an exporting
adjunct of a manufacturer or group of manufacturers; 33 it may acquire
the goods of others to export;34 or it may provide any of several export
related services, including the provision or facilitation of financing, insur-
ance or transportation.35 One commentator has stated that:
[i]n its perfect form such an entity would be a "one-stop shop" that would
buy a product from a manufacturer and assume the risk of selling it, includ-
ing identifying a market, concluding the sale, and arranging for financing,
transportation, custom, and insurance. A more limited approach would be
an entity which, while not taking title to the manufacturer's goods, would
handle all aspects of the transaction, utilizing its expertise both here and
abroad through foreign offices or foreign agents.
3 6
In contrast, the president of an existing international trading com-
pany views such firms primarily as financiers of trade activities,37 while
others view them as vehicles for combination by domestic service or
manufacturing competitors for competing abroad.3 8
33 The Senate bill, S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), required eligible export trading compa-
nies to provide some services to "unaffiliated" exporters. S. REP. No. 27, supra note 1, at 8. This
requirement was abandoned by the Conference Committee and trading companies need not provide
services to unaffiliated firms. CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 734, H. REP. No. 924, 128 CONG. REC.
H8341, H8346 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
34 See S. 144 Hearings, supra note 1, at 213 (testimony of John M. Bowles).
35 S. REP. No. 27, supra note 1, at 5.
36 Reinsch, supra note 10, at 48.
37 S. 144 Hearings, supra note 1, at 214 (testimony of John M. Bowles).
38 Id. at 219 (testimony of Peter Guttman), 284-292 (statement of Milton Schulman). Title III
of S.734, as enacted by the Senate, would have amended the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-
66 (1982), and distinguished trading companies from trade associations. The Conference Committee
adopted a procedure that does not alter the Webb-Promerene Act and does not explicitly refer to
trade associations. In fact, the definition of "export trade association" was deleted by the conferees.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at H8346.
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The various potential forms of trading companies make any general-
ization about scale economies unreasonable. The economies of a trading
company engaged in manufacturing, for example, will depend largely on
the efficiencies attainable through increases in the scale of the relevant
manufacturing process. On the other hand, the available scale economies
of a trading company offering limited, specialized services may bear no
relationshp to other trading company formats.
F.M. Scherer, a prominent industrial organization expert, notes that
there are frequently distinct advantages enjoyed by firms of various sizes
in the same industry: "Each such size-correlated advantage may be ex-
ploited by entities in the favored size-class, and it is commonplace for
entities of quite diverse sizes to coexist and survive profitably, each serv-
ing some subset of the market to which its special attributes are best
adapted."39 The inherently diverse nature of trading companies suggests
that they would develop naturally along a broad spectrum of sizes, each
company filling a specific niche in the market for export services.
Nobel prize-winning economist George Stigler has written that the
best way to determine the optimum size or sizes of firms in a particular
industry is to observe the performance of firms over time and identify the
"survivors. '
The survivor technique proceeds to solve the problem of determining the
optimum firm size as follows: Classify the firms in an industry by size, and
calculate the share of industry output coming from each class over time. If
the share of a given class falls, it is relatively inefficient, and in general is
more inefficient the more rapidly the share falls. . . . An efficient size of
firm, on this argument, is one that meets any and all problems the entrepre-
neur actually faces: strained labor relations, rapid innovation, government
regulation, unstable foreign markets, and what not.
41
Applying the survivor technique to export trading companies, it again
appears that there is a fairly wide range of firm sizes that can efficiently
serve the needs of exporters. As noted earlier, there are about 2,000
small- or medium-sized firms plus several giant trading companies.42
This does not suggest that there never would be advantages available
to large trading companies. Trading companies seldom will be primarily
engaged in manufacturing, and, therefore, the economies associated with
39 F.M. SCHERER, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-
TRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 18 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER]. See F.M. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 81-118 (1980); G. STIGLER,
THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968); J. MCGEE, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUS-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (1974).
40 STIGLER, supra note 39.
41 Id. at 73. See MCGEE, supra note 39, at 80-83.
42 See supra text acompanying notes 27-3 1.
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the increased scale of productive capacity frequently will not be applica-
ble. Those firms purchasing for resale, however, may obtain some pro-
curement economies from large size,43 and capital-raising" and
managerial45 scale economies also could be applicable in the context of
traditional trade intermediaries.
In short, the implicit assumption that large trading companies will
be more efficient than small, more specialized firms ignores the complex-
ity of this issue. Moreover, the legislation creates the danger that a fed-
eral bureaucracy charged with promoting export trading companies,46
routing potential customers to such entities,47 and granting limited pro-
tection from the antitrust laws48 will assume that it must foster large
firms. The Commerce Department and Federal Reserve Board therefore
must insure that its efforts to foster the development of significant sized
trading firms will not interfere with efficient small firms able to compete
effectively for this commerce.49
Proponents of the Act have claimed that the legislation will generate
new jobs for American workers.5" This belief is based primarily on a
study conducted by Chase Econometrics which concluded that "[B]y
1985, the impact of these companies would be sufficient to increase cur-
rent dollar Gross National Product by between $27 billion and $55 bil-
lion without causing significant additional inflation. Employment would
be increased by 320,000 to 640,000 workers."51
The Chase study, however, assumed a constant exchange rate and
that assumption distorts the conclusions.52 Increases in export sales will
strengthen the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies and that in turn will stim-
ulate imports and lessen the demand for United States exports. 53 There-
43 SCHERER, supra note 39, at 42-43.
44Id. at 51.
45 Id. at 41-51. Scherer questions the existence of managerial economies and the social utility of
procurement and capital-raising efficiencies. Contra McGEE, supra note 39, at 77-80.
46 ETC Act, §§ 104, 202.
47 Id. § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 4003 (1982).
48 Id. § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1982).
49 The Federal Reserve Board has an explicit mandate to foster small bank participation. Id.
§ 202(3).
50 See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. E2333 (daily ed. May 19, 1982) (statement of Rep. Don Bonker,
citing Secretary of Commerce Baldridge); 128 CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement
of Rep. John La Falce); Taylor, Law to Encourage Joint Export Ventures Is Expected to Be Signed by
Reagan Today, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1982, at 12, col. 2 (citing Sen. John Heinz).
51 CHASE ECONOMETRICS/INTERACTIVE DATA CORPORATION, THE MACROECONOMIC IM-
PACT OF AUTHORIZING U.S. EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CHASE
STUDY].
52 Id. at 15.
53 REPORTS BY THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 111-3 to 111-7.
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fore, the gains in export commerce generated by the success of a trading
company may be met by losses elsewhere in the domestic economy. A
major study of competitiveness of United States industry, for example,
notes that "an improvement in the international competitive perform-
ance of one industry, because of its effect on the exchange rates, may
contribute to a deterioration in the international competitiveness of other
industries."54
The study conducted by Chase recognizes that changes in the ex-
change rate will effect the nature of the benefits to the United States
economy. Rather than simply increasing exports and employment in
those industries successfully exporting, the success of trading companies
will stimulate imports at lower costs to United States consumers and will
dampen inflation. 5 The projected increases in exports and employment
are, therefore, in part a surrogate for the benefits of cheaper imports. 6
The Congressional assumptions regarding scale economies and in-
creased employment demonstrate the legislature's tendency to minimize
difficult issues. The United States' performance in the international mar-
ketplace is affected by numerous factors. As already noted, the exchange
rate-with the dollar maintaining a consistently strong position-has a
dramatic impact on the ability of Americans to export.57 Other obvious
and significant factors include the wages and productivity of United
States workers, the ability of United States management, the strength of
the economies of other nations, and the trade philosophies of United
States foreign trading partners. 8
This does not of course mean that the Export Trading Company Act
will not have desirable effects on United States export performance. Its
impact, however, will be felt at the margin and likely will develop gradu-
ally. Furthermore, any number of external factors could dissipate the
gains that trading companies are expected to achieve.
54 Id. at 111-4.
55 CHASE STUDY, supra note 46, at 15.
56 Id.
57 See Pine, Dollar's Strength in Face of Rate Decline Challenges Firms that Vie With Imports,
Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1982, at 56, col. 1: Leger, US. Competitiveness Hurt by Dollar Rise, By Swelling
Wages Over Salaries Abroad, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 38, col. 1.
58 See ANDERSON, U.S. AND FOREIGN PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITIVENESS, FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 1 (1981); Pugel, Foreign Trade and U.S.
Market Performance, 29 J. INDUS. ECON. 119 (1980); U.S. Exports Decline As Foreign Economies
Slide Into Recession, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 6; Silk, Why the U.S. Fell Behind, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at D2, col. 1.
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III. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Office of Export Trade
The only substantive provision of title I of the Export Trading Com-
pany Act establishes an "Office of Export Trade" in the Commerce De-
partment.59 This office shall promote the establishment and use of export
trading companies.6"
The efficacy of a new federal export promotion office likely will be
minimal. There are numerous federal agencies presently charged with
the promotion or facilitation of export trading, including the Depart-
ments of Commerce and Agriculture, the Small Business Administration,
and the Export-Import Bank.6" In fact, the Secretary of Commerce testi-
fied at Senate hearings that there was no need for a new agency within his
Department.62
Since the new office's promotional duties essentially duplicate ex-
isting federal programs, its value will depend primarily on the manner in
which it implements the certification procedure established by title III of
the Act.
B. Bank Export Services Act
Title II of the legislation, the "Bank Export Services Act," allows
bank holding companies, bankers' banks63 and Edge Act Corporations'
to invest in and extend credit to export trading companies. The Senate
bill would have authorized more substantial bank participation and es-
tablished more specific restrictions. 65 The House, however, limited par-
ticipation to institutions regulated under the Bank Holding Company
59 "The Secretary of Commerce shall establish within the Department of Commerce an office to
promote and encourage to the greatest extent feasible the formation of export trade associations and
export trading companies. Such office shall provide information and advice to interested persons
and shall provide a referral service to facilitate contact between producers of exportable goods and
services and firms offering export trade services." ETC Act § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 4003 (1982).
60 Id. See S. REP. No. 27, supra note 1, at 9.
61 Many of the federal export expansion programs are identified and described in the following
publications: DELOIr"E, HASKINS & SELLS, EXPORTING, SMALL AND GROWING BUSINESSES
(1981); INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXPORT
PROMOTION FUNCTIONS AND POTENTIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVES (1980); INDUSTRY AND TRADE
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, A BASIC GUIDE TO EXPORTING (1979); SMALL BUSINESS
ADMIN., EXPORT MARKETING FOR SMALLER FIRMS (4th Ed. 1979).
62 S. 144 Hearing, supra note 1, at 41 (testimony of Malcolm Baldrige, Sec. of Commerce).
63 "Bankers banks" are owned by banks and transact business solely with banks. Abbott, supra
note 26, at 41.
64 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-32 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981). Edge Act corporations engage in international
or foreign banking and related financial operations.
65 S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1981);See Reinsch,supra note 10, at 79-91; S. REP. No.
27,supra note 1, at 11-13.
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Act66 and the Conferees adopted the House version.67 Because the Act is
an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, it was not necessary
to include all of the restrictions contained in the Senate bill.68
The Act represents a compromise between policies that traditionally
have divorced banks from commercial activities69 and those that would
eliminate most restraints on bank participation in export activities. 70 It
allows bank holding companies71 to invest not more than five percent of
their consolidated capital and surplus in the shares of export trading
companies.72  It also authorizes bank holding companies with equity in-
vestments in an export trading company to lend up to ten percent of their
combined capital and surplus to export trading companies.73
An investment, however, generally may not be made until sixty days
after the Federal Reserve Board has received written notice of the hold-
ing company's intent to invest in an export trading company.74 The
Board may disapprove a proposed investment if:
(I) such disapproval is necessary to prevent unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices, undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair compe-
tition, or conflicts of interest;
(II) the Board finds that such investment would affect the financial or
managerial resources of a bank holding company to an extent which is
likely to have a materially adverse effect on the safety and soundness of any
subsidiary bank of such bank holding company, or
(III) the bank holding company fails to furnish the information re-
quired under clause (iii).
75
66 12 U.S.C. 1843 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).
67 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at H8346.
68 Id.
69 "U.S. banks have been excluded from most commercial activities, including direct participa-
tion in export trade for more than a century. Among the reaons given for maintaining the tradi-
tional distinctions are: (1) that banks should focus on loans and deposits and can better exercise
independent judgment on whether or not to make a loan if they are prohibitied from holding a stake
in the management of actual or potential borrowers; (2) that banks could (sic] be exposed to unfamil-
iar and excessive risks in commercial trading and the holding of inventories; (3) that the bank regula-
tory agencies lack the capacity to evaluate the commercial risks banks would encounter in owning
export trading companies; (4) that bank capital is low and should be reserved for support of bank
loans; and (5) that bank-owned export trading companies or companies dealing with them may have
preferential access to bank credit." S. REP. No. 27, supra note 1, at 11.
70 See, e.g., "The doctrines of the free interplay of market forces and fair competition, however,
suggest that all investors be allowed to own trading companies if they so choose." BARRETT &
DAPARMA, THE U.S. EXPORT TRADING COMPANY LEGISLATION-A TIP OF THE EXPORT EXPAN-
SION ICEBERG, at 10 (Mar., 1982) (prepared for the National Foreign Trade Council).
71 For convenience this article will refer to all banking institutions covered by the Act as bank
holding companies.
72 BES Act § 203(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14).
73 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(B)(i)(1982).
74 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(A)(i)(1982).
75 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(A)(iv) (1982).
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To foster effective bank participation, the Act requires the Board of
Governors to adopt regulatory policies that will (1) allow the establish-
ment of trading companies with sufficient power to compete internation-
ally; (2) assure American firms constant access to export services;
(3) foster participation by regional and small banks; and, (4) stimulate
the creation of joint ventures with non-banking firms.76
An export trading company with bank participation may not engage
in securities transactions, except to the extent that bank holding compa-
nies are allowed to do so, nor engage "in agricultural production activi-
ties or in manufacturing."77 A holding company extending credit to a
trading company in which it has invested may not take any unusual
risks, and must extend credit under the same terms to other similarly
situated export companies.78
Finally, the Act authorizes the Export-Import Bank of the United
States to guarantee loans extended to export trading companies, 79 and
allows banks to trade more freely in "bankers acceptances. "80
Some banking institutions were extremely supportive of efforts to
enact this legislation.81 One trade journal reported that some banks were
actually so anxious to participate that they planned to form trading com-
panies before the Federal Reserve Board could publish regulations imple-
menting title 11.82 Subsequent events, however, have shown that the
initial enthusiasm has given way to a more cautious attitude. Some of
the nation's largest banks have indicated that they will participate in
trading companies,8 3 but the response has not been overwhelming.84
Several factors may help to explain the banks' caution. First, their
trading company activities will be regulated and the banks do not yet
know how supportive the Federal Reserve Board will be.85 Second, the
market for export trade does not exist in a competitive vacuum. Bankers
will have to compete with some of the most aggressive and successful
76 Id.
77 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(C)(i)-(ii) (1982).
78 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(B)(iii) (1982).
79 12 U.S.C. § 635a-4 (1982).
80 12 U.S.C. § 372 (1982). See Abbott, supra note 26, at 41, where the author defines bankers'
acceptances as "IOUs that run for less than six months and are used in export financing." See also
Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV. 716 (1973).
81 S. 144 Hearings, supra note 1, at 187-212. (statements of J. Hallam Dawson, President, Bank-
ers' Association for Foreign Trade and Douglas R. Stucky on behalf of The American Bankers
Association).
82 Wash. Tariff & Trade Letter, Vol. 2, No. 47, 1 (Nov. 29, 1982).
83 Bank America, for example, has announced that it plans to form an export trading subsidiary.
Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
84 Banks Shun Export Trading Companies for Now, J. OF COM., Jan. 10, 1983, at 24.
85 Id. ; Abbott, supra note 26, at 40.
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firms in the world, including Japanese trading companies. Banking insti-
tutions also may have problems adjusting to the highly entrepreneurial
nature of export trading.86 Bankers, conservative by nature and regu-
lated by a risk averse agency, likely will approach the risk-taking world
of international traders with caution.
Because foreign export trading companies are generally highly lever-
aged, there was some expectation that bank participants would extend
substantial credit to firms in which they have some equity interest.87 The
Act, however, prohibits banks from extending unreasonable or discrimi-
natory credit to any trading firm.88 All credit decisions therefore would
have to be prudent and any gains in available financing would result from
increased knowledge about the risks and opportunities of export trading
that banks may gain from close participation in trading activities.
Banks will not commit capital, either through investments in equity
or extensions of credit, to ventures that are too risky for other sources of
capital, but they will provide an infrastructure that may stimulate the
growth of trading companies. The Senate Banking Committee has
stated:
banking organizations have two resources which are essential to establish-
ing a viable export trading company. First, through their retail banking
operations, banking organizations are able to reach out to large numbers of
small- and medium-sized companies who may manufacture exportable
products. Second, through their international branches and foreign corre-
spondent banking relationships, banking organizations are in an excellent
position to identify foreign markets and customers.
89
This Article cannot deal at length with the role of banks in the de-
velopment of export firms. Some major financial institutions likely will
play significant roles in the growth of major United States trade in-
termediaries. They can provide an in-place international structure as
well as substantial financial and related experience.
The immediate response to the Act, however, demonstrates that
bank participation holds no particular magic that will expand dramati-
cally the United States share of the international market. There are no
large pools of "cheap" or high-risk money suddenly available for trading
company activities. Success will be determined by competitive market
forces, and only those trading companies, with skilled management and
86 See Marcuss & Grushkin, New ExportAct Offers New Opportunities, Conflicts, LEGAL TIMEs,
Mar. 21, 1983, at 25.
87 S. 144 Hearings, supra note 1, at 215 (testimony of John M. Boles, President, Boles & Co.,
Inc.).
88 BES Act, § 203 (3), 12 U.S.C. 1843 (c)(14)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (1982).
89 S. REP. No. 27, supra note 1, at 6; see S. 144 Hearings, supra note 1, at 193 (statement of J.
Hallam Dawson, President, Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade).
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efficient organizations, with or without bank participants, will survive in
the long-run.
C. Antitrust Provisions
Two titles of the Export Trading Company Act have impact on the
international application and enforcement of United States antitrust
laws: title IV, the "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,"9
amends the Sherman 9' and Federal Trade Commission Acts;
92 title II193
provides limited antitrust immunity for activities reviewed and certified
by the Commerce Department, with the concurrence of the Attorney
General.94
1. Antitrust Improvements Act
In 1980, near the close of the 96th Congress, the Senate passed an
Export Trading Company Act bill.9" That legislation died in the House
of Representatives in part because the members of the Monopolies Sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary believed the bill raised seri-
ous antitrust issues that could not be considered adequately during the
remainder of that Congress.96
Early in the 97th Congress, Congressman Peter Rodino, Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee, introduced the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act.97 To the extent that the antitrust laws presented a
needless barrier to desirable export promotion practices, the sponsors of
the bill believed that this problem should be addressed directly, without
new or expanded exemptions or regulatory apparatus.98 They therefore
proposed amending the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization
and combinations in restraint of trade,9 9 and section 7 of the Clayton
90 Antitrust Improvements Act, §§ 401-403.
91 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
92 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46, 47-58 (1982).
93 ETA Act §§ 301-312; 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21 (1982).
94 ETA Act § 303; 15 U.S.C. § 4013 (1982).
95 S. 2718, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980), was passed by the Senate on September 3, 1980. 126
CONG. REc. S11,924-25 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1980).
96 Reinsch,supra note 10, at 69-72. The House Banking Committee also prevented S. 2718 from
proceeding to the House floor for consideration. Id.
97 H.R. 2326, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 2326].
98 Remarks of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., International Trade Seminar "How to Export," 5-7
(Toms River, N.J. Oct. 2, 1981). See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Comm. Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 2326, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (statement of Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judici-
ary) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 2326 Hearings].
99 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
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Act,"o which proscribes, inter alia, joint ventures that may lessen com-
petition or tend to monopoly.' 0 '
The proposed Sherman Act amendment would have limited the in-
ternational reach of the statute. Export activities would have been sub-
ject to Sherman Act scrutiny only if they directly and substantially
affected the commerce of the United States or if they foreclosed a domes-
tic competitor from a foreign market.102 The amendment was intended
to eliminate the chilling perception that collective activities impacting
solely on foreign competitors or consumers in foreign markets fall within
the proscriptions of the Act. 03 The proposed amendment was consistent
with the holdings of most relevant judicial decisions and essentially
would codify existing enforcement policy."° The amendment neverthe-
less was believed to be desirable in light of the body of case law and
scholarly authority favoring a broader application of the Sherman Act.1
0 5
As finally enacted, the legislation limits the jurisdictional reach of
the Sherman Act to conduct involving non-import foreign commerce
that has a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
United States imports or on the inter- or intra-state commerce of the
United States, and which also is a substantive violation of the Act.
10 6
Generally speaking, this amendment frees United States business to en-
gage in concerted export, or other wholly foreign business activities,
without fear of antitrust reprisal if the domestic effects are incidental and
insubstantial. The requirement that the conduct also violate the Act
eliminates any implication that the "effects" criterion establishes a sub-
stantive standard: that is, the fact that there is a direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect does not mean, without more, that the Sher-
man Act has been violated.'
0 7
The Sherman Act also continues to prohibit joint conduct that has a
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on
100 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
101 Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
102 H.R. 2326, supra note 97, § 2.
103 127 CONG. REC. H779 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Rodino and Rep. McClory
regarding H.R.2326).
104 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, RESOLUTIONS AND REP. TO ACCOMPANY RESOLUTIONS
CONCERNING LEGIS. PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE EXPORT TRADING (Oct. 26, 1981), reprinted in
H.R.2326 Hearings, supra note 98, at 224-235. But see Rahl, Reforming American Antitrust in For-
eign Commerce, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1130, 1137 (1983).
105 H.R. 2326 Hearings, supra note 98, at 37-38 (statement of David Goldsweig), and at 107-08
(statement of Martin F. Connor on behalf of the Business Roundtable); Garvey, supra note 10, at 6-
18.
106 Antitrust Improvements Act, §§ 402, 403, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1982).
107 See H.R. 2326 Hearings, supra note 98, at 110 (statement of Martin F. Connor).
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the export trade of an exporter doing business in the United States.1
08
But if liability is based on the impact on an individual, as opposed to
commerce in general, only the injured exporter may recover.' 0 9 When a
general anticompetitive effect on commerce has been experienced, how-
ever, all injured parties, foreign and domestic, will have a cause of
action."o
An identical change was made to that portion of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting unfair methods of competi-
tion. 1 " Generally, section 5 proscribes all conduct that tends toward a
violation of the other antitrust laws." 2 The FTC Act amendment, how-
ever, prevents section 5 from inhibiting activities that the Sherman Act
amendment places beyond its reach.
As introduced, the Improvements Act removed all joint export ven-
tures from scrutiny under section 7 of the Clayton Act." 3 Like the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, section 7 embodies an "incipiency"
standard, i.e., it prohibits conduct that is likely to lessen competition or
tend toward monopoly. I 4 The change would have subjected export joint
ventures to the amended Sherman Act provisions rather than this "incip-
iency" standard. The amendment, however, was deleted by the House
and Senate conferees and export joint ventures remain subject to the
Clayton Act restrictions.'15
The primary test under the amended statutes will surely be "sub-
stantiality." If an enforcement agency or court finds concerted foreign
conduct to have a substantial anticompetitive effect on United States
commerce, either quantitatively or qualitatively, it likely will perceive of
the effect as both direct and foreseeable." 6 On the other hand, behavior
having relatively little domestic impact will probably be permitted unless
there is evidence that the adverse effects in the United States were a pri-
mary purpose of the actors.
108 Antitrust Improvements Act, § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1982).
109 Id.
110 Id.
I11 Antitrust Improvements Act, § 403, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(1982).
112 Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463-67 (1941).
113 H.R. 2326, supra note 97, § 3.
114 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
115 Fugate, supra note 2, at 702-03.
116 See, e.g., Int'l Trade Admin., Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of
Review, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,937, 15,939 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines] where the Commerce
Department quidelines state that "conduct will be certified unless it has a substantial anticompetitive
impact in the domestic market or on U.S. export competitors."
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2. Certificate of Review
Title III establishes a "certificate of review" that grants limited anti-
trust immunity to recipients of the certificate. Applicants may be certi-
fied to engage in export trade and related activities if their conduct will
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint
of trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint of the export
trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the
United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class ex-
ported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors
engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class
exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in
the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the goods,
wares, merchandise, or services exported by the applicant. 17
A certificate of review protects its holders from antitrust actions by fed-
eral and state authorities for activities identified in the document while it
remains in effect. 18 Any person injured by certified activities that are
not in compliance with the above standards for certification may sue
under this statute for injunctive relief and actual damages including in-
terest and the costs of suit.' The Attorney General also may seek an
injunction to prevent "conduct threatening clear and irreparable harm to
the national interest."'
120
Two provisions of the Act are intended to discourage frivolous suits
against certified trading companies. There is a rebuttable presumption
that certified activities are in compliance with the standards, 121 and suc-
cessful defendants will recover the costs of defending the litigation. 22
3. Implementation
There is a direct relationship between the provisions of title III and
title IV. The House and Senate conferees stated their intent that the
standards for certification "encompass the full range of the antitrust
laws."' 123 Therefore, the Commerce Department may not issue a certifi-
cate authorizing any person to violate the antitrust laws. Essentially,
three questions will have to be answered by the certifying agencies: Is
117 ETA Act, supra note 8, § 303(a), 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1982).
118 Id. § 306(a), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(a)(1982).
119 Id. § 306(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1)(1982).
120 Id. § 306(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(5)(1982).
121 Id. § 306(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(3)(1982).
122 Id. § 306(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4)(1982).
123 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 26.
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the certificate being sought for export trade and related activities and
methods of operation?' 24 Is the proposed conduct likely to have a direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States domestic
commerce or competing exporters? And, if so, is it likely to violate the
antitrust laws?
Horizontal agreements-those between competitors-involving
prices, markets or production almost invariably violate one or more of
the antitrust laws.125 The sole issue in such cases therefore will be the
probable effect on domestic commerce. The Commerce Department
guidelines indicate a sensitivity to this issue. They note that the agency
will guard against agreements that facilitate domestic collusion and also
will scrutinize closely agreements between firms in highly concentrated
industries. 126
Vertical agreements-those between persons at different levels of
production and/or distribution-on the other hand, may require an anal-
ysis to determine if the proposed conduct is unreasonable,127 as well as an
assessment of the probable domestic impact. The requirement that certi-
fied conduct not operate as a "substantial restraint of the export trade of
any competitors of the applicant"' 28 adopts the "exclusionary" strain of
antitrust policy embodied in vertical restraints frequently involving boy-
cotts and tying arrangements. 129
4. Limitations and Pitfalls
The Act provides a private remedy for unfair methods of competi-
tion against domestic competitors for export trade in the goods or serv-
ices of the applicant. 130 This provision expands the potential liability of
certified companies because there is no private remedy for violations of
the "unfair methods of competition" prohibition of section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.' 3 ' This potential liability may present a seri-
ous problem for trading companies because section 5 embodies a
nebulous standard that prohibits, among other things, activities that tend
toward a violation of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.'3 2 The Com-
124 See Guidelines, supra note 116, at 15,938-39.
125 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
126 Guidelines, supra note 116, at 15,939.
127 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 44 (1977).
128 ETA Act § 303(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1)(1982).
129 See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
130 ETA Act § 303(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(3)(1982).
131 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
132 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
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merce Department has attempted to mitigate this problem by stating in
its guidelines that "judicial decisions interpreting section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, while illustrative, have only limited precedential
significance."' 3 3 The fact remains, however, that Congress intended the
Act's standards to embody the "full range of the antitrust laws"' 34 and
this provision may invite substantial private litigation.
135
There are also several practical disadvantages to seeking certifica-
tion. First, there is the problem of delay. The determination regarding
certification must be made within ninety days but cannot be made sooner
than thirty days after an application is published in the Federal Regis-
ter. 136 International trade, however, is a dynamic venture and opportu-
nities must often be taken immediately or lost. 137 Therefore, exporters
may have to forego the safety of certification to seize an opportunity.
One hopes that the existence of an immunization process will not result
in needless timidity, denying the United States of opportunities to expand
export trade.
138
Those seeking certification also must disclose potentially sensitive
information. The Act provides for confidentiality and exempts disclosed
information from the Freedom of Information Act, but the protection is
limited.' 39 For example, the prohibition against disclosure relates only to
confidential or privileged information if disclosure would harm the appli-
cant.14 Furthermore, the Secretary of Commerce still may order disclo-
sure of this information if it is necessary to determine whether the
certificate should be issued.'41 Finally, all information submitted, which
may include market share, production, and pricing data, will be trans-
mitted to the Department of Justice.142 In particular situations these fac-
tors could cause potential exporters to avoid the certification procedure
and abandon a desirable export opportunity. Assuming, however, that
U.S. 316 (1966). See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 1 158 (a) (3d
ed. 1981).
133 Guidelines, supra note 116, at 15,939.
134 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 122.
135 See Fugate, supra note 2, at 703.
136 ETA Act § 303(b), 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(1982).
137 Garvey,supra note 10, at 27;Inside Philipp Bros., A $9 Billion Supertrader, BUs. WK., Sept. 3,
1979, at 108.
138 The Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982), has been interpreted to carry an impli-
cation that export activities are fully subject to the U.S. antitrust laws unless the Webb procedures
are utilized. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 320 (1978); J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, 2 ANTI-
TRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 351-52 (2d ed. 1981).
139 ETA Act, § 309, 15 U.S.C. § 4019 (1982).
140 Id. § 309(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 4019(b)(1) (1982).
141 Id. § 309(b)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 4019(b)(2)(D)(1982).
142 Id. § 302(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 4012(b)(2)(1982).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:818(1983)
the Commerce Department will be extremely sensitive to the needs of
business applicants, it is unlikely that the potential for disclosure will
have much of a chilling effect on salutary joint export activities.
Certification also subjects trading companies to continuing oversight
and regulation by the federal bureaucracy. Certified companies must file
annual reports and promptly report all material changes in their activi-
ties or methods of operation.143 In addition, the Commerce Department
or Attorney General may revoke or amend the certificate whenever
either becomes aware that the activities of the certified company no
longer comply with the standards for certification. 1" The costs of regu-
lation unfortunately will impact most dramatically on those potential ex-
porters that are the primary intended beneficiaries of the Act: small- and
medium-sized firms.'45 As with the problems of disclosure, enlightened
regulatory polices may minimize this potential dilemma for smaller
firms, but cannot eliminate it.
The Antitrust Improvements Act as introduced would have allowed
exporters to make an independent judgment regarding the domestic im-
pact of their conduct and to proceed, if appropriate, without seeking a
certificate of review. The failure to amend section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 146 however, may make certification necessary for joint ventures
whose members are competitors or potential competitors. The incipient
standard of section 7 reaches mergers, including joint ventures, which
tend toward monopoly by increasing market concentrations. 4 7 It can
apply to a joint venture formed to engage in foreign commerce148 and,
because its substantive standards are substantially less rigid than those of
the amended Sherman Act, prudent members of a joint export venture
may feel compelled to seek a certificate of review.149 There are costs to
143 Id. §§ 304(a)(1), 308, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4014(a)(1), 4018 (1982).
144 Id. § 304(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 4014(b)(1)(1982).
145 Garvey, supra note 10, at 22.
146 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
147 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); Yamaha Motor Co. v.
F.T.C., 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); BOC Int'l Ltd. v. F.T.C., 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
148 Donovan, Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving American and Foreign Corporations
Under the Untied States Antitrust Laws, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 38, 107-12 (1967); Graham, Hermann &
Marcus, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Mergers Involving Foreign Interests, 23 STAN. L. REV. 205,
221-27 (1971). See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 138, at 78-118; B. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUsT: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 241-306
(1979); Atwood, International Joint Ventures and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 10 AKRON L. REV. 609
(1977); Joelson & Griffin, Multinational Joint Ventures and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 VA. J. INT'L
L. 487 (1975).
149 An export venture may also seek protection from the application of section 7 by complying
with the requirements of the Webb-Pomerene Act. Fugate, supra note 2, at 703.
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seeking certification, however, and it is unfortunate that joint venturers
may feel compelled to apply even when their proposed conduct is desira-
ble and clearly within the contemplation of the Act.
The Commerce Department's guidelines introduce a potentially se-
rious impediment to effective implementation of the new law. It states
that the Act's standards embody "the substantive law of antitrust as
modified by the Webb-Pomerene Act (emphasis added)."15 Further, the
guidelines cite the Minnesota Mining'51 case, apparently as an interpre-
tive precedent for the trading company act. 152 Few things could jeopard-
ize more seriously the efficacy of the legislation than the adoption of
Webb-Pomerene precedents and policies.
The Webb-Pomerene Act, like the Export Trading Company Act,
was intended to promote exporting by small- and medium-sized United
States firms.' 53 It has stimulated little export trade in recent years, how-
ever, and on the whole has not benefited small firms.154 The Federal
Trade Commission, for example, has found that Webb-Pomerene As-
sociations are primarily made up of large producers of homogeneous
products. 5 5 The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures similarly concluded in 1979 that "the common fea-
ture of export associations today is not their performance or efficiency or
cost-reducing functions, but rather the pursuit of traditional cartel-re-
lated activities."'
156
Webb-Pomerene judicial precedents are few' 57 and they have gener-
ally tended to limit that Act's exemption.' 58 It is particularly disturbing
that the Department of Commerce would cite Minnesota Mining as a
controlling precedent. That decision has been criticized for its broad
dicta regarding the nature of the domestic impact needed to find foreign
15o Guidelines, supra note 116, at 15,939.
151 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass 1950).
152 Guidelines, supra note 116 at 15,939 n.12.
153 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-
YEAR REVIEW 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FTC 50-YEAR REVIEW].
154 NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORTS
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 298 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NCRALP
REPORT].
155 FTC 50-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 153, at 69.
156 NCRALP REPORT, supra note 154, at 297. But see McDermid, The Antitrust Commission
and the Webb-Pomerene Act: A Critical Assessment, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105, 111 (1980).
157 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968); United States v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); United States v. United States
Alkali Export Ass'n, 58 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), afl'd, 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
158 See Fugate, supra note 2, at 679-86.
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joint activities illegal.159 Alleged uncertainty about the scope of the
Webb-Pomerene exemption was, in fact, a primary motivating factor be-
hind the Export Trading Company Act. 16  That same uncertainty
should not be read immediately into the new law.
The federal agencies administering the Trading Company Act there-
fore should avoid analogies to the Webb-Pomerene Act. That law has
generated confusion and proven itself to be of little practical conse-
quence. In addition, Congress has chosen to use a new vehicle for export
promotion while leaving the Webb-Pomerene Act as it is.161 Most im-
portant, however, Webb-Pomerene Associations frequently have been
more concerned with traditional cartel activities than promoting effi-
ciency and exports. 62  If the Export Trading Company Act is to pro-
mote the goals of its creators-more effective United States competition
for export trade-trading companies and federal enforcement agencies
must be committed to efficiency-promoting combinations that will ex-
pand trade, not profit maximizing cartels that limit production and trade.
The existence of foreign antitrust laws also creates barriers to some
concerted trading company activities. The guidelines state that "appli-
cants should be aware that other nations have competition laws with
which they must comply. The certificate does not confer immunity from
foreign competition laws." 163
A thorough analysis of foreign competition laws is beyond the scope
of this article. The European Community (EC), however, as well as sev-
eral member nations, have competition policies that are in many respects
analogous to the United States antitrust laws."64 These policies generally
will apply to the concerted activities of United States firms if they have
the proscribed effect within the EC or in the particular nation.
65
There are two areas of particular concern to United States firms
forming combinations to export to Europe. First, traditional cartel activ-
ities-limiting production and raising prices-may subject them to for-
eign enforcement action. In 1981, for example, the European
159 Joelson & Griffin, Multinational Joint Ventures and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 VA. J. INT'L
L. 487, 511-12 (1975).
160 S. REP. No. 27, supra note 1, at 7.
161 Fugate, supra note 2, at 702; see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, The
Green Memo: The Export Trading Company Act of 1982, P.L. 97-290, at 11 (Nov. 3, 1982).
162 See supra text accompanying note 145.
163 Guideline, supra note 116, at 15,938.
164 See B. HAWK, supra note 148, at 411-27.
165 Id. at 455-59. The West German Act against Restraints of Competition specifically states,
"This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition which have effect in the area in which this Act
applies, even if they result from acts done outside such area." Section 98(2), reprinted in 5 World
Law of Competition, W. Ger GAI - 67 (Von Kalinowski, ed., 1979).
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Commission objected to the activities of several non-Common Market
firms, including members of United States Webb-Pomerene Associations,
that resulted in fixed prices for the sale of pulp in the EC.166 After con-
sultation with United States officials, EC officials noted that they would
proceed against foreign export associations having substantial anti-com-
petitive effects in the Community regardless of the legal status of the
combination in other nations. 167 Similar activities by United States firms
relating to the sale of goods in West Germany are likely to violate the
competiton laws of that nation, as well as those of the EC.
168
The European sensitivity to certain types of vertical agreements also
presents a potentially significant problem for United States trading com-
panies. Professor Hawk, for example, notes that vertical territorial re-
strictions are almost per se illegal under European Commission and
Court of Justice precedents. 169 United States antitrust policy, however,
subjects such non-price restraints to a rule of reason analysis.
170
The Commerce Department guidelines also indicate that resale price
maintenance is a method of operation that may be certified, if Trading
Company Act standards are satisfied. 171 This practice, however, is spe-
cifically prohibited in several nations, including France, Luxembourg,
the United Kingdom, and Germany, and may violate EC rules as well.
172
Once again, the European resolve in this area may be stronger, at least at
the moment, than that of the United States.1
73
To summarize, the antitrust provisions of titles III and IV of the
Export Trading Company Act provide opportunities for United States
firms to reduce their risk of antitrust exposure when engaging in export-
related activities. There are, however, costs associated with this protec-
tion and limits to the extent that the law can or does provide immunity
against liability. Title IV basically codifies existing antitrust enforcement
policy, and title III's certification procedure does not permit the Com-
merce Department to authorize antitrust violations. The certificate may
issue only if the Department finds that the standards which Congess in-
tends to be co-extensive with the antitrust laws are met. Finally, the Act
166 B. HAWK, supra note 148, 1983 Supp., at 39.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 109-10.
169 Id. at 587.
170 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
171 Guidelines, supra note 116, at 15,938-39.
172 E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
IN PERSPECTIVE, 810-11 (1976). See B. HAWK, supra note 147, at 625-28, and 1983 Supp., at 242.
173 Resale price maintenance is stillperse illegal under U.S. law, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), but the rule has come under attack by antitrust enforcers
lately. See 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1096, at 18 (Jan. 6, 1983).
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does not have any impact on the application of foreign competition laws
and policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Export Trading Company Act is a reasonable but limited re-
sponse to some of the problems that United States producers face as they
adjust to a market that is increasingly dependent on international trade.
The Act represents some lessening of the United States government's re-
solve to foster freer international markets, but it avoids more strident
protectionist measures. United States producers, however, should not
have great expectations that this legislation will increase immediately or
dramatically export opportunities.
The Act, and the agencies administering it, should foster a greater
awareness of the potential that foreign markets offer domestic firms not
presently exporting. Efficient trading companies may provide informa-
tion, convenience and some risk-sharing qualities not currently available
to small firms. Ultimately, however, the ability of the United States to
provide high-quality products and services at competitive prices will dic-
tate the United States role in international trade. In addition, the volume
of international trade will depend to a great extent on factors beyond the
control of trading companies, such as the health of foreign economies,
the exchange rate, and the impact of foreign trade barriers.
At this germinal stage it is important that the several administrative
bodies responsible for administering the law recognize the primacy of
market forces-not as a matter of policy, but as fact. Combinations and
activities promoting efficiency will have long-term salutary effects on
United States export performance. Those that result in limited produc-
tion, but higher profits for their members, will reduce exports and misal-
locate United States resources. Moreover, a trading company engaged in
traditional cartel activities will have a strong, perhaps irresistible, ten-
dency to destory effective competitors through predatory conduct when-
ever possible.
The Commerce Department, as well as the Federal Reserve Board,
therefore should discount some of the generalizations that have accom-
panied this legislation. "Big" trading companies, for example, may not be
better than smaller ones, and policies favoring larger firms may impede
the most efficient organization of an industry. The best policies under
these circumstances will be those that interfere least with the natural de-
velopment of markets while insuring that private firms do not acquire
monopolistic power.
Firms seeking to join or form trading companies also should appre-
The Export Trading Company Act
5:818(1983)
ciate the need for sound counseling. A certificate of review is not a li-
cense to violate the antitrust laws and an improvidently granted
certificate does not eliminate the potential for suit. Furthermore, the
competition laws of foreign nations must be considered and their require-
ments satisfied. Since domestic and foreign competition policies are con-
cerned largely with the existence of a position of dominance, the larger a
trading company or its members are, the greater their exposure will be.
To conclude, the Export Trading Company Act will help expand
United States exports if the federal bureaucracy contains its zeal and the
business community avoids short-term avarice. The establishment of effi-
cient trade intermediaries will, over time, integrate the United States
more fully into the international marketplace and their presence will pro-
mote trade. Any expectation, however, that this legislation will produce
immediate and substantial gains in United States performance is unjusti-
fied and any attempts to achieve spectacular results could be counter-
productive. Trading firms must complement, not displace, the one factor
that will bring about long-term benefits: an efficient, productive domestic
economy.
